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Abstract. The paper presents a new steganographic method called LACK (Lost 
Audio PaCKets Steganography) which is intended mainly for VoIP. The method is 
presented in a broader context of network steganography and of VoIP 
steganography in particular. The analytical results presented in the paper concern 
the influence of LACK’s hidden data insertion procedure on the method’s impact 
on quality of voice transmission and its resistance to steganalysis.  
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1. Introduction 
Communication network steganography is a method of hiding secret data in users' normal data transmissions, 
ideally, so it cannot be detected by third parties. One of the most popular steganographic techniques is to use a 
covert channel, which enables manipulating certain properties of the communications medium in an unexpected, 
unconventional, or unforeseen way. In the past few years the interest in steganographic methods that may be 
used in computer networks has grown considerable, mostly due to presumed usage of hidden communication by 
terrorists [ 27]. Many new methods have been proposed and analyzed, e.g. [ 1], [ 2] or [ 3]. In this paper we 
propose a classification of network steganography methods. On this background we present and analyse the 
performance of a new steganographic method called LACK (Lost Audio PaCKets Steganography) which was 
recently proposed and filed for patenting [ 23]. The general idea of the method was described in [ 24]. LACK is 
intended for a broad class of multimedia, real-time applications, but its main foreseen application, at least for 
now, is IP telephony. The method utilizes the fact that for usual multimedia communication protocols like RTP 
(Real-Time Transport Protocol) excessively delayed packets are not used for reconstruction of transmitted data 
at the receiver, i.e. the packets are considered useless and discarded. 
 
 
Fig. 1 VoIP stack and protocols 
 
Voice over IP (VoIP), or IP telephony, is one of the services of the IP world which is changing the entire 
telecommunications landscape. Because of its popularity, it is becoming a natural target for steganography. We 
propose to name steganographic techniques applied to VoIP traffic steganophony. This term, if accepted, would 
pertain to information hiding techniques in any layer of the TCP/IP protocol-stack (Fig. 1), including methods 
such as audio watermarking and techniques applied in speech codecs.  
 
For VoIP systems, four possible hidden communication scenarios may be considered, as illustrated in Fig. 2. 
The first scenario (1 in Fig. 2) is most common: the sender and the receiver perform VoIP conversation while 
simultaneously exchanging steganograms. The conversation path is the same as the hidden data path. In the next 
three scenarios (marked 2-4 in Fig. 2) only a part of the VoIP end-to-end path is used for hidden communication 
as a result of actions undertaken by intermediate nodes; the sender and/or receiver are, in principle, unaware of 
the steganographic data exchange. 
 Fig. 2 Hidden communication scenarios for VoIP 
 
 
Steganophony may be classified into three groups (Fig. 3): 
 
(S1) Steganographic methods which modify packets – network protocol headers or payload fields. 
Examples of such solutions include (a) modifications of free/redundant headers’ fields of IP, UDP or 
RTP [ 10] protocols during conversation phase and (b) modification of signaling messages in e.g. SIP 
[ 11]. Information hiding which is based on affecting packets’ payload usually uses digital audio 
watermarking algorithms, e.g. DSSS [ 12] or QIM [ 13]. 
 
(S2) Steganographic methods which modify packets’ time relations, e.g. by affecting the sequence 
order of RTP packets, modifying their inter-packet delay or by introducing intentional losses. 
 
(S3) Hybrid steganographic methods which modify both the content of packets and their time 
relations. An example of such solution is the LACK method, which is presented in this paper. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Steganophony classification 
 
Examples of methods from group S1: 
• Methods which modify protocols specific fields – SIP, SDP [ 16], RTP, RTCP [ 10] (VoIP specific 
protocols) and additionally: IP, TCP, UDP (network specific protocols). 
• Methods which modify packets’ payload: audio watermarking algorithms, speech codec steganographic 
techniques (e.g. using SID frames or codec specific steganographic methods). 
• Mixed techniques: HICCUPS (Hidden Communication System for Corrupted Networks, [ 4]). 
 
Some characteristic features of methods from group S1: 
• Steganographic methods which use protocol specific fields usually yield relatively high steganographic 
capacity. Implementation and detection is relatively straightforward. Drawback: potential loss of some 
of the protocols’ functionality. 
• Steganographic methods which utilize payload of the packets generally yield lower steganographic 
capacity and are harder to implement and detect. Drawback: potential deterioration of voice quality. 
• Mixed techniques offer high steganographic capacity, but the implementation is harder due to required 
low-level access to hardware. For the same reason steganalysis is harder to perform. Drawback: 
increased frame error rate. 
 
Examples of the steganographic methods from group S2: 
• Methods which affect sequence order of packets [ 15] (in VoIP possible only for RTP). 
• Methods which modify inter-packet delay [ 14] (in VoIP possible for RTP and RTCP; for some 
protocols, e.g. SIP, not useful due to small number of messages). 
• Methods which introduce intentional losses by skipping sequence numbers at the sender [ 5] (for RTP 
and RTCP protocols). 
 
Some characteristic features of methods from group S2: 
• Sender-receiver synchronization required.  
• Lower steganographic capacity and harder to detect than in the case of methods which utilize protocol 
specific fields. 
• Straightforward implementation. 
• Drawback: potential deterioration of conversation quality. 
 
As already mentioned, LACK is an example of hybrid steganographic methods from group S3 which modify 
both packets and their time dependencies. In section 2 LACK is presented in some detail and performance issues 
involved in using the method are discussed. Section 3 introduces and analyses a procedure for inserting hidden 
data; the procedure takes account of the estimated voice call duration. In section 4 the influence of using LACK 
on voice QoS is analysed. Section 5 concludes our work and indicates possible future research. 
 
 
2. LACK – The Idea and Performance Issues 
At the transmitter, some selected audio packets are intentionally delayed before transmitting. If the delay of 
such packets at the receiver is considered excessive, the packets are discarded by a receiver which is not aware 
of the steganographic procedure. The payload of the intentionally delayed packets is used to transmit secret 
information to receivers aware of the procedure, so no extra packets are generated. For unaware receivers the 
hidden data is “invisible”. 
LACK may be used in four basic scenarios illustrated in Fig. 4. In scenario (1), one packet is selected from 
the RTP stream and its voice payload is substituted with bits of  the steganogram. In scenario (2) chosen packets 
are delayed by a certain time and then sent through the communication channel. In scenario (3), if an excessively 
delayed packet reaches a receiver unaware of the steganographic procedure, it is discarded. In scenario (4), if the 
receiver knows about the hidden communication, then instead of deleting the packet the receiver extracts the 
payload. 
 
Fig. 4. LACK scenarios 
LACK, although it is an application layer steganography technique, is less complex to implement than most 
audio steganography algorithms. This is due to the fact that RTP is usually integrated in telephone endpoints 
(softphones) so access to RTP packets generation and modification is easier to perform than in the case of lower 
layer protocols like IP or UDP.  
 
The performance of LACK depends on many factors such as the details of the communication procedure (in 
particular the type of codec used, the size of the voice frame, the size of the receiving buffer, etc.) and on the 
network QoS (packet delay, packet loss probability and jitter). We discuss these issues in the following. 
 
No real-world steganographic method is perfect – whatever the method, the hidden information can be 
potentially discovered. In general, the more hidden information is inserted into the data stream, the greater the 
chance that it will be detected, e.g. by scanning the data flow or by some other steganalysis methods. Moreover, 
the more audio packets are used to send covert data, the greater the potential deterioration of the quality of VoIP 
connection. Thus the procedure of inserting hidden data has to be carefully chosen and controlled in order to 
minimize the chance of detecting inserted data and to avoid excessive deterioration of QoS. 
To avoid excessive deterioration of QoS lost packet ratio must be kept below a certain, accepted level. This 
level depends on the speech codec. For example, according to [ 20], maximum loss tolerance is 1% for G.723.1, 
2% for G.729A and 3% for G.711 codecs. If a special mechanism to deal with lost packets at the receiver is 
utilized, e.g. the PLC (Packet Loss Concealment) [ 21], then the acceptable level of lost packets e.g. for G.711 
codecs increases from 3% to 5%. Thus the amount of steganographic data that can be inserted by LACK, and in 
effect the additional packet loss introduced by LACK, depends on the acceptable level of the total packet loss. 
For example, for the G.711 speech codec with data rate 64 kbit/s and data frame size of 20 ms, if the packet loss 
probability introduced by the LACK procedure is 0.5%, then the theoretical hidden communication rate is 320 
b/s.  
To guarantee that the an audio packet will be recognized as lost by receiver, it must be excessively delayed by 
the LACK procedure. To set this delay, the size of the receiver’s de-jitter buffer must be taken into account. A 
de-jitter buffer is used to alleviate the jitter effect, i.e. the variations in packets arrival time caused by queuing, 
contention and serialization in the network. The size of the buffer is implementation-dependent. It may be fixed 
or adaptive, and is usually between 30 and 70 ms; RTP packet will be recognized as lost when the delay is 
greater than the delay introduced by the de-jitter buffer. LACK users have to exchange information about the 
sizes of their de-jitter buffers before starting the steganographic procedure. To limit the risk of detection of the 
hidden data, the delay chosen by LACK users should be as low as possible. 
Additionally, packets losses introduced by the network must be carefully monitored. Because LACK uses 
legitimate RTP traffic, thus it increases overall packets losses. To ensure that the total packet loss introduced by 
the network and by LACK will not degrade perceived quality of the conversation, the level of the lost packets 
used for steganographic purposes must be controlled and dynamically adapted. 
 
Steganalysis of LACK is harder to perform than for most other steganographic methods that were described in 
Section 1. Packet loss in IP networks is a “natural phenomenon”, so intentional losses introduced by LACK are 
not easy to detect, if kept on a reasonable level. Potential LACK steganalysis methods include:  
• Statistical analysis of lost packets for calls in some sub-network. This type of steganalysis may be 
implemented with a passive warden [ 22] (or some other network node), based e.g. on information 
included in RTCP reports (cumulative number of packets lost field) exchanged between users during their 
communication or by observing RTP streams flow (packets’ sequence numbers). If for some of the 
observed calls the number of lost packets is higher than average (or some chosen threshold) this may be 
used as an indication of potential use of LACK. 
• Statistical analysis based on VoIP calls duration. If the call duration probability distribution for a certain 
sub-network is known, then statistical steganalysis may be performed to discover VoIP sources that do not 
fit to the distribution (the duration of LACK calls may be longer than non-LACK calls in effect of 
introducing steganographic data). 
• An active warden [ 22] which analyses all RTP streams in the network (SSRC identifier and fields: 
Sequence Number and Timestamp from RTP header) can identify packets that are already too late to be 
used for voice reconstruction. The active warden may erase their payloads fields or simply drop them. A 
potential problem which arises in this case is to avoid eliminating delayed packets that still may be used 
for conversation reconstruction. The size of the jitter buffer at the receiver is, in principle, unknown to the 
active warden. If an active warden drops all delayed packets, then it will potentially drop packets that still 
can be useful for voice reconstruction. In effect, the quality of conversation may deteriorate considerably. 
Moreover, not only steganographic calls are affected but also  non-steganographic ones are “punished”. 
What follows from the performance issues mentioned above is that the LACK procedure of inserting hidden 
data has to be carefully designed. The focal point of this paper is the design and analysis of hidden data insertion 
rate IR [bits/s]. IR depends on the amount of hidden data to be sent and on the call duration. In principle, the call 
duration may be adjusted to the amount of hidden data to be sent. This, however, could cause that the 
distribution of calls applying LACK differs from the call duration distribution of LACK-less calls, and as a 
consequence make LACK vulnerable to statistical steganalysis based on call duration. Thus rather than adjusting 
the call duration to the amount of hidden data to be sent, it is preferable to adjust the hidden data insertion rate IR 
to LACK-less calls duration probability distribution. This, in turn, requires making IR dependent on that 
distribution. Obviously, this is especially important in the case of a predefined group of frequent LACK users, 
rather than in the case of sporadic use of LACK. In the present paper we focus on the former case.  
It should be emphasised that the hidden data insertion procedures introduced and analysed in this paper can be 
utilized by decent LACK users who use their own VoIP calls to exchange covert data, but also by intruders who 
are able to covertly send data using third party VoIP calls (e.g. in effect of earlier successful attacks by using 
trojans or worms or by distributing modified versions of a popular VoIP software). This is a usual tradeoff  
requiring consideration in a broader steganography context which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
 
3. Hidden Data Insertion Rate (IR) 
In the following analysis we consider the dependence of the hidden data insertion rate IR for a particular call 
on the elapsed time of that call, i.e. we consider IR that is made time dependent. As shown in our analysis, such 
time-dependent IR procedure allows for decreasing the IR during the call duration, compared to the IR at call 
initiation time. In effect, the negative influence of LACK on QoS can be decreased and resistance to steganalysis 
increased, especially for call duration distributions with coefficient of variation much greater than 1. Available 
experimental data concerning VoIP call duration distributions seem to indicate that this is realistic for real-life 
VoIP calls. Our goal in this section is to express IR with the coefficient of variation for possibly wide range of 
call duration distributions.  
 
For PSTN the call duration probability distribution was well known due to extensive experimental research. 
For many decades the exponential distribution was assumed a good enough approximation for engineering 
purposes. VoIP is a relatively new service and thus only few reliable experimental data is available, so in many 
research papers concerning IP voice traffic (e.g. [ 7], [ 8], [ 9]) the exponential call duration is still assumed. 
Current experiments prove however that this assumption is far from being realistic. 
Birke et al. [ 6] captured real VoIP traffic traces (about 150 000 calls) from FastWeb, an Italian telecom 
operator. The obtained call duration probability distribution is reproduced in Fig. 5 with a solid line. To illustrate 
qualitatively the degree in which the experimental results differ from exponential distribution and some other 
chosen distributions (hyperexponential and log-normal), these are drawn with broken lines in Fig. 5. As can be 
seen, the differences are considerable and no straightforward approximation of the experimental data with 
standard distributions is available.  
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Fig. 5. VoIP call duration – comparison of experimental distribution with selected standard probability 
distributions 
 
The experimental data from [ 6] yields average call duration E(D) = 117.31 and standard deviation σ(D) = 
278.74, thus the coefficient of variation CV = σ(D)/E(D) = 2.37 (for the exponential distribution CV = 1). 
To achieve an analytic approximation of the experimental data a combination of some standard distributions 
can be used, for example: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
The above analytic approximation is quite complex and of little practical use for our purposes, i.e. for 
establishing the dependence of the insertion rate IR on some simple enough characterization of the call duration 
distribution.  
A reasonably wide range of call distribution types can however be achieved and effectively analysed/used with 
the 2-parameter Weibull distribution and appropriately chosen parameters: the shape parameter k > 0 and the 
scale parameter λ > 0. The complementary cumulative probability distribution function )( DF  and probability 
density function (fD) are as follows: 
  
 
 
(2) 
The λ parameter was set so to achieve the above experimental average call duration time E(D) = 117.31 and 
the k parameter was varied so to obtain a wide range of CV values. In Tab. 1 the analyzed values are summarized. 
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λ=103.54 
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k=0.5, 
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k=0.4, 
λ=35.3 
CV 0.32 0.52 0.84 1 1.26 1.76 2.23 3.14 
Table 1. Weibull distribution parameters k and λ and corresponding CV values. 
 
In Fig. 6 the Weibull probability distribution is depicted for the parameters from Tab. 1 to illustrate the 
resulting wide range of distribution shapes. Note by the way that for k = 1 the Weibull distribution equals the 
exponential distribution (CV = 1), for k = 2 it becomes the Rayleigh distribution (CV = 0.52) and for k = 3.4 it 
resembles the normal distribution (CV = 0.32). 
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Fig. 6. Weibull distribution for various k, λ and CV 
 
For an arbitrary instant of a call the average residual call duration is well know to be equal 
 
 
 
(3) 
or equivalently 
  
 
(4) 
Suppose that at the beginning of a call the insertion rate is set to IR = S/E(D), where S is amount of data to be 
sent covertly. If CV>1 then E(R) > E(D), which seems to be the case for VoIP real-world calls as indicated above, 
then beginning from some arbitrary instant of the call we may decrease the insertion rate to IR = S/E(R), which is 
beneficial from the point of view of call quality and resistance to detection of the hidden data. 
The above indicates that it is reasonable to make the insertion rate dependent on the elapsed time of a call. It is 
nevertheless not practical to use the classical definition of residual call duration since it involves an arbitrary 
time instant and not the current call duration. We are rather interested in the expected call duration on condition 
it has already lasted t units of time:  
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(7) 
and 
 
 
 
(8) 
For chosen parameters from Tab.1 we obtain results shown in Fig. 7. The figure shows also the E(D|D>t) 
function for the experimental data presented in Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 7. E(D|D>t) for different Weibull distributions and for the experimental data distribution 
 
The curves from Fig. 7 may be approximated with good accuracy as follows: 
 
 
(9) 
If SR(t) is the amount of data remaining to be sent covertly at instant t of the call, then the insertion rate at time 
t is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(10) 
Based on results presented in Fig. 7 and eq. 10, assuming S = 1000 bits, the IR(t) functions are as presented 
in Fig. 8. 
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Fig. 8. IR(t) for chosen Weibull distributions, S=1000 bits 
 
As can be seen from Fig. 8, the hidden data insertion rate IR(t) may be decreased during the call duration 
compared to its initial value S/E(D). This is the desired effect which was aimed at: as the call proceeds, the IR is 
adjusted – decreased – according to the expected remaining duration of the call, which is, as already mentioned, 
beneficial from the point of view of voice quality and resistance to steganalysis. This feature is illustrated 
qualitatively in Fig. 9; in quantitative terms the feature is expressed by eq. 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(11) 
 
Fig. 9. The effect of using IR(t) based on E(D|D>t) 
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4. Dependence of the Insertion Rate IR on Estimated Call Quality 
In this section we focus on the dependence of the insertion rate IR on estimated call quality resulting from 
packet loss. Call quality may be expressed in terms of subjective and objective quality measures. Objective 
measures are usually based on algorithms such as the E-Model [ 18], PAMS or PESQ [ 26].  The objective 
measures can be transformed into subjective quality measures. In our analysis we shall use the subjective 
measure MOS (Mean Opinion Score) [ 25] which according to [ 19] can be related to packet loss probability  ploss 
as follows: 
 
 
(12) 
where α, β and γ are network/service-type dependent parameters; for Skype telephony the parameters were 
evaluated to be [ 19]: α = 3.0829, β = - 4.6446 and γ = 1.07. 
 
Since LACK introduces additional packet loss pLACK then in the above equation ploss should be substituted with  
ploss + pLACK : 
 
 
(13) 
Fig. 10 shows the dependence of MOS on ploss for different values of pLACK, assuming α, β and γ  values 
estimated for Skype telephony. 
 
Taking into account the call-duration insertion rate IR(t) principle introduced in the previous section and that  
 
 
(14) 
 
where NP is the number of RTP packets generated in a unit of time and PP is the length of a RTP packet data 
field, then  
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Fig. 10. MOS dependence on ploss and pLACK for Skype telephony 
 
If the MOS probability distribution for a considered network in which LACK is to be used is known, then the 
above equation can be used to set appropriate IR(t) values so that the additional deterioration of voice quality 
introduced by LACK is kept below a desired threshold.  
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Fig. 11 presents the MOS probability distribution for a VoIP network based on experimental data from [ 6]. If 
the shape of the presented curve could be considered typical, then establishing an appropriate adjustment of IR(t)  
based on eq. 15 is rather straightforward. 
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Fig. 11. MOS probability distribution (experimental data [ 6]) 
 
An alternative to the approach described above is to adjust IR(t) based on online measurement of voice quality 
during the call. Such an approach would require online exchange of information on voice quality parameters 
between the sender and the receiver, e.g. with the use of the RTCP protocol (Sender Reports and Receiver 
Reports [ 10] or Extended Reports [ 17]). 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
The LACK steganographic method is a new idea which requires detailed performance evaluation. This paper 
is an initial step in this direction. We have focused mainly on the hidden data insertion rate IR procedure and its 
dependence on estimated average call duration and voice quality. It was shown that the insertion rate may be 
effectively made dependent on the current call duration time, and that this dependence can be expressed with 
good accuracy with the coefficient of variation of the call duration probability distribution. We have also derived 
analytical relations which enable making IR(t) dependent on voice quality parameters. All derived formulae are 
simple and can be straightforwardly implemented.  
The effectiveness of the resulting hidden data insertion procedure will depend on the accuracy of the estimated 
mean call duration, the coefficient of variation of the call duration and the probability distribution of voice 
quality for the network (sub-network) which is intended to be used for sending steganographic data with the 
LACK method. Thus to evaluate realistically this effectiveness more experimental data has to gathered, 
nevertheless the authors believe that the analysis presented in this paper indicates that LACK provides good 
chance for high effectiveness. 
Because LACK is a hybrid steganographic method in the sense of the classification introduced in this paper, 
then the steganographic bandwidth it can provide may be expected to be comparable or slightly lower than for 
methods which modify packets only, and higher than for methods which only modify packets’ time relations. 
However to determine the effective, real-world steganographic bandwidth that LACK can provide, more 
research has to be undertaken. In particular, a more realistic, experimental based data concerning network QoS 
parameters have to be gathered.  
Moreover, more sophisticated (than presented in this paper) hidden data insertion procedures could be 
considered. The idea of making the insertion rate time dependent can be further developed, i.e. by for example 
considering the probability P(D>x|D>t), x>t, rather than E(D|D>t) as is the case in the analysis presented in this 
paper. Also the dependence of the hidden data insertion rate IR on call quality measures can be extended in order 
to take into account not only packet loss, but also packet delay and jitter. The alternative is to adjust IR(t) on the 
basis of online measurements of voice quality parameters during the call duration. 
Analytical and experimental results concerning the above issues will be presented by the authors in 
forthcoming papers. 
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